Secured Transactions by Uskevich, Robert J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 8
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 4
7-1-1967
Secured Transactions
Robert J. Uskevich
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Secured Transactions Commons
This Uniform Commercial Code Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Uskevich, Secured Transactions, 8 B.C.L. Rev. 764 (1967),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol8/iss4/4
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
LEASES AS SECURITY: SOME PROBLEMS OF IDENTIFICATION
The leasing of industrial equipment has become a common commercial
practice for two principal reasons: it requires substantially less capital outlay
than would an outright purchase' and, in many cases, it presents a significant
tax advantage.2
 There are, however, other—less legitimate—motives which
might lead to the wider and more imaginative use of the lease form to cover
what is really a security agreement.3 For example, a buyer might seek to
combine the benefits of ultimate ownership with the tax advantages of a leasing
arrangement, or a conditional seller might attempt to protect his interest in the
goods concerned without complying with the Code's filing requirements?
Similarly, the seller might try to arrange the transaction so that he could, if
necessary, recover the collateral while evading the provisions of either the
Code5 or the Bankruptcy Act.°
Consider, for example, a buyer who is in financial difficulty, and who
wants to buy machinery which depreciates very slowly. If there is a default,
it is possible that a judgment sale would yield a significant cash surplus' which
a lessor could retain but which a conditional seller would have to remit to the
debtor under section 9-504(2) of the Code. Moreover, under section
9-501(3) (a), 8
 there would be no way that a debtor could waive this right in
a security agreement; in such a case, the seller could find a "lease" with option
to purchase quite attractive. In addition, if most of the lease payments would
ultimately be applied to the purchase price, it is unlikely that a buyer would
object, especially if he were in financial difficulty and in urgent need of the
goods. It is apparent, then, that a lease may be a true, bona-fide lease or a lease
1
 Griesinger, Pros and Cons of Leasing Equipment, 33 Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April
1955, pp. 75-76.
2 Rentals under such a lease are deductible from gross income. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 162(a) (3). Purchase price and installment payments are not so deductible, but
the equipment purchased is depreciable. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a) (1).
3 See U.C.C. §§ 9-105(h), 1-201(37).
4 See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -401, -402.
5
 See U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507, which provide a scheme for reclamation and protec-
tion of security.
G See Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), as amended, 66 Stat. 424 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1964); Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), as amended, 80 Stat. 269, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(c) (Supp.
1966). These sections give to the trustee in bankruptcy certain rights and powers which
a seller may be able to circumvent by disguising the sale as a lease.
7
 Although forced sales seldom cover the amount of the debt, it is possible that
heavy equipment could depreciate so slowly that its value at any time would be con-
siderably greater than the balance owed.
s That section provides that "the rules stated [in §§ 9-502(2), -504(2)] . . . may
not be waived or varied . , . insofar as they require accounting for surplus proceeds of
collateral . . ."
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"intended as security."') It should be equally apparent that courts must be
able to distinguish and identify these transactions for purposes of tax collec-
tion, bankruptcy administration, and protection of debtors and third parties
in secured financing. The purpose of this comment is to examine some of the
problems which must be dealt with in attempting to characterize these kinds
of transactions justly and consistently.
It must be recognized at the outset that the question before the courts in
these cases is a factual determination of whether the parties to a "lease" really
intended it as a security agreement; there is seldom any dispute as to the legal
consequences attendant upon the possible answers to the question. As a
result, the two major difficulties which have been encountered thus far are
chiefly problems of fact-finding: The infinite variety of possible fact situations
has impeded the development of adequate standards for decision making, and
the parol-evidence rule, coupled with "entire-agreement clauses,"" has raised
the more basic question of what evidence should be available to the fact-
finder in making this determination.
As to the development of standards, it is interesting to note that these
disguised conditional sales were first attacked by the Internal Revenue
Service,11 and that, by 1955, the problem had grown to such an extent that
a new Revenue Ruling was promulgated. 12 However, the problem of character-
izing these transactions has not yet been entirely solved, largely because the
facts of each case are so unique that it has not been possible to codify suffi-
ciently precise standards of general applicability. 13 It is apparent that this
same difficulty is present in attempting to construe and apply the standards
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code.
In section 1-201(37), the Code has attempted to deal specifically with
the problem of leases intended as security, and it provides certain limited
guidelines to aid in resolution of these questions:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the
facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to pur-
chase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and
(b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease
the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the
property for no additional consideration or for a nominal considera-
tion does make the lease one intended for security.
It is clear that these standards are designed to be flexible enough to enable one
to ascertain the true function of a transaction regardless of its form, but since
9 See U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
10 Such a clause is a written expression by the parties that the instrument is the
complete integration of their agreement.
11 See, e.g., Burkett v. Commissioner, 31 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1929); Benton v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 19.52).
12 Rev. Rut. 540, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 39.
13 For example, in Kearny & Trecker Corp. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 158
(E.D. Wis. 1961), the agreement provided for three different purchase options and high
rental payments in the early years, while in Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, 213
A.2d 875 (1965), there were twenty separate writings evidencing the agreement and a
claimed option to purchase based on an oral understanding.
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so few cases have been decided under this section it is not yet clear whether
this approach will provide an adequate means of consistently deciding this
kind of case.14
 In evaluating the effectiveness of these provisions, nevertheless,
it is instructive to examine the relevant decisions.
In one of the earliest Code decisions in this area, In re Royer's Bakery
Inc.,° the agreement in question purported to be a lease of equipment for a
term of thirty-five months, but it allowed the lessee to terminate the agreement
at any time on thirty-days notice with payment of only the amount due up to
that time. In addition, the lessee had an option to purchase the equipment at
any time during the term of the lease, and, if he chose to do so, eighty per
cent of the aggregate rentals paid up to that point would be applied toward the
purchase price. The lease also contained a one-year renewal provision with all
the same terms, including the option to buy. When the lessee's business failed,
the lessor filed a reclamation petition seeking to recover from the lessee's
trustee in bankruptcy the proceeds of the sale of the equipment. The trustee
resisted the petition on the ground that the lease was really an unperfected
security interest. The referee 'accepted the trustee's argument and denied
reclamation, relying in large part upon standards articulated by the Internal
Revenue Service.lc He stated that, "whenever it can be found that a lease
agreement . . . contains provisions the effect of which are to create in the
lessee an equity or pecuniary interest . . . the parties are deemed as a matter
of law to have intended the lease as security within the meaning of [U.C.C.]
sections 9-102 and 1-201(37) . . . . "17
The result reached in this case is undoubtedly correct under section
1-201(37) (b), but it is not clear that the referee's reasoning was either correct
or necessary to the result. On the facts of the case, it is apparent that the
"equity" being created in the lessee was so substantial as to compel the in-
ference that a security interest was intended. The rental payments for the
term of the lease plus one renewal would be more than enough to cover the
entire purchase price of the equipment without the payment of any additional
consideration. This does not mean, however, that the referee was correct in
declaring that the creation of any equity or pecuniary interest in the lessee is
enough, as a matter of law, to preclude a finding that the transaction is truly
a bona-fide lease agreement.
The better reasoning would seem to be that of United Rental Equip. Co.
v. Potts & Callahan Contracting Co.,is a case remarkably similar to Royer's
Bakery. There the contest was between the lessor and one who had purchased
the equipment at a sheriff's sale resulting from a judgment and execution
against the lessee. The lease called for a term of one month and then was to
continue until the equipment was returned; the lessee had an option to pur-
chase under which eighty-five per cent of his rentals would be applied to the
purchase price. Relying exclusively upon section 1-201(37) (b), the court
14 See also U.C.C. § 9-102, Comment 1.
15 56 Berks County L.J. 48, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
16 See 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 1, acquiescing in Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 446
(1949).
17 I U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 345-46.
18 231 Md. 552, 191 A.2d 570 (1963).
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held that since, at some point, it would he possible for the lessee to take title
without paying any additional consideration, the intention of the parties was
to create a conditional sale rather than a lease. As indicated above, this
reasoning could very well have been used in Royer's Bakery, thereby render-
ing irrelevant the discussion of the "creation of an equity."
The flaw in Royer's Bakery is obviously the breadth of its language, for
certainly there could be many cases in which the bona-fide lessee would be
establishing some substantial equity or pecuniary interest. One such case is
In the Matter of Wheatland Elec. Prods. Co.," in which the court was again
concerned with the application of section 1-201(37). Here the bankrupt had
leased equipment under a written agreement which was to run for one year 20
and which gave the lessee an option to purchase for a stated sum. If the option
was exercised, seventy-five per cent of the rentals would be applied to seventy-
five per cent of the purchase price, so that here, unlike the previous cases, the
lessee would always have to pay at least twenty-five per cent of the price re-
gardless of how he timed his purchase. The lease was later modified and ex-
tended, but retained the same option clause; ultimately it was extended a
second time, and at that point the option to buy was deleted from the agree-
ment. The court held that the agreement was a true lease and not one intended
as security. This decision was based on the fact that the exercise of the pur-
chase option required the payment of more than a nominal consideration,
and, in addition, on the fact that the option to purchase had expired before it
was exercised. 2' This result seems clearly correct, since the option to purchase
could never be exercised by the lessee without the payment of substantial
consideration. Even if he waited until the termination of the lease, he would
still be required to pay an additional twenty-five per cent of the list price. On
the question of consideration, then, it seems that the Code guidelines, as they
were applied in Wheatland and United Rental, are useful in the determination
of the true intention of the parties to an agreement. 22
The Wheatland court, however, did not rely solely on this issue, but relied
also on the absence of a purchase option. It is not at all clear whether this fact
standing alone would necessarily be conclusive on the issue of intent, especially
when, as here, the lease is not looked at as of the date of execution but as of
a point later in time. 22 Certainly the absence of such a clause is strong evi-
dence that the lease is not intended for security, but it would seem that, as
in Royer's Bakery, the significance of any one particular factor has been
10 237 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
20 The length of a lease and the termination conditions may often be illuminating as
to the parties' true intention. For example, in Wheatland the lease could not be terminated
for at least one year, and the option to purchase could not be exercised before this time;
in United Rental and Royer's Bakery, on the other hand, the lease could be terminated
and the option to purchase could be exercised at any time.
21 237 F. Supp. at 822.
22 It is submitted that if the Wheatland court had applied the rationale of Royer's
Bakery—that the creation of an equity establishes a lease to be security as a matter of
law—it is probable that a different result would have been reached.
23 Tax decisions require that the determination of the issue of intent be made as of
the date the parties entered into the agreement, See, e.g., Beckwith Mach. Co. v.
Matthews, 190 Md. 182, 192, 57 A.2d 796, 801 (1948).
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articulated far to strongly. In this respect, it seems that these two decisions
share a common deficiency: they both seem unaware that they are making a
factual determination which over time may be unique and that, consequently,
the breadth of their language does a disservice. It is clear that in developing
rules to deal with these cases, the courts must recognize that such a potentially
great variety of factual variations requires a more general and flexible ap-
proach, and that present solutions must anticipate the problems which are
likely to occur. Section 1-201(37) of the Uniform Commercial Code was
designed to provide for such a flexible approach, and the courts should be
conscious of this in rendering their decisions.
The second major problem which arises in such cases is determining what
evidence the court may consider in attempting to ascertain whether the parties
intended the "lease" as security. Obviously, sections 1-201(37) and 9-102(1)
(a) and (2) look to an identification of actual intent regardless of form, and
any exclusionary rules which would tend to inhibit the success of this inquiry
must be regarded suspiciously. The parol-evidence rule 24 is one such rule which
is particularly important here, especially when the instrument contains an
entire-agreement clause. 25 This problem is illustrated by In the Matter of
Atlanta Times, Inc.,-'" in which the court refused to admit evidence of an oral
purchase option. In that case, the bankrupt had leased certain equipment for
a ten-year term, and the "lease" contained no purchase option. The agreement
recited that it was a lease, and that it constituted the entire agreement between
the parties, but the trustee in bankruptcy contended that the transaction con-
stituted a conditional sale, and that the rentals were really the installment
payments. At the trial, the trustee offered the testimony of the lessee to the
effect that the parties had also agreed to a purchase option which could be
exercised for a nominal consideration. The lessor objected to the introduction
of this evidence, and in the alternative denied the allegation. The court ex-
cluded the testimony on two grounds: first, because it sought to vary the terms
of the written agreement in violation of the parol-evidence rule; and, second,
because under Georgia case law, "where the written agreement also contains
an 'entire agreement' provision, it is conclusively presumed that the writing
contains the entire agreement in regard to the subject matter." 27
The second reason given by the court is particularly significant, because
the parol-evidence rule standing alone will not necessarily exclude evidence
of a purchase option.'s The rule operates in two stages. The first stage allows
the introduction of evidence in order to rebut the presumption that the
writing under consideration is a complete expression or integration of the
agreement of the parties. If any evidence, including parol evidence, can show
that the writing is only a partial integration, then the second stage can
operate to allow the admission of evidence to prove the content of the missing
terms. At both stages, of course, evidence is still excluded if it tends to prove
terms which are inconsistent with the principal writing.
24 See U.C.C. § 2-202.
25 See note 10 supra.
26 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
27 Id. at 825.
28 Obviously a purchase option is not necessarily inconsistent with a true lease.
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Returning to the Atlanta case, then, it can be seen that an entire-agree-
ment clause rigidifies the parol-evidence rule by barring evidence of a partial
integration. When this clause is given the benefit of a "conclusive presump-
tion," the court may not consider any evidence tending to show even terms
which are entirely consistent. As was shown above, moreover, the principal
standards which have been successful to date have dealt with inferences to
be drawn from the agreement itself. If Atlanta and Wheatland are read
together, the result is a good example of the possible misuse of one of these
clauses. In Wheatland, the absence of an option to purchase was considered
very significant in determining the intent of the parties, but under Atlanta,
evidence of such an option would be inadmissible if -the lease contained an
entire-agreement clause. It is certainly arguable that less respect ought to be
given to attempts of the parties to shield the true nature of their transaction
when the effect is to facilitate an evasion of legal duties.
The Code provides that the intention of the parties is determinative of
the creation of a security interest, regardless of the form of the transaction.'`'
By giving effect to an entire-agreement clause, the court limits the evidence
which can be considered in determining the true intention of the participants
in a transaction, and at the same time places the emphasis on its form.
The Code has premised its treatment of these transactions on the actual
intention of the parties, but Wheatland and Atlanta limit the extent of the
examination which can be made in determining that intent. Whether any
compensating purpose is served by allowing the use of entire-agreement
clauses in this kind of case is highly questionable. They open the door to
collusion between the lessor and lessee to insulate the equipment from claims
of the lessee's creditors. For example, the parties may simply draw a lease
without a purchase option, while making separate arrangements to pass title.
If the instrument contains an entire-agreement clause, evidence of the separate
arrangements will be inadmissible, and if, as in Wheatland, the court
considers the absence of a purchase option highly controlling on the issue of
intent, it will be impossible to treat the sham lease as a conditional sales
contract. As a result, the purpose of section 1-201(37) will be greatly
frustrated, and its effectiveness severely inhibited. It should be obvious that
entire-agreement clauses may serve a useful purpose in other legitimate
transactions, but that in the area of leases intended as security they are
retarding the development and use of badly needed standards. It is suggested,
therefore, that it would not be inappropriate to deny effect to entire-agree-
ment clauses in this area on the ground that they frustrate an important and
clearly expressed policy. This would then permit the introduction of evidence
of many other relevant factors, and would allow the courts to make a far
more intelligent determination of the true intention of the parties. Such
procedure would be in accord with the trend in evidence today, that is, to
allow the introduction of more evidence and have any objections go to the
weight the court should give it."°
As stated above, the development of effective standards and the admis-
1J.C.C. § 1-201(37). See also U.C.C. § 9-102, Comment 1.
:10 See, e.g., 2 Davis, Administrative Law § 14,01, at 251 (1st ed. 1958).
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sibility of certain evidence are the two major problems in this area. Codifica-
tion of standards has not yet presented a complete solution, partly because of
judicial acceptance of entire-agreement clauses. As has been suggested, the
nullification of these terms may facilitate the development of the ultimate
solution. If the courts cannot reach a solution, the law will be faced with the
clearly undesirable task of mitigating the harshness of its own inadequacy.
Instead of distinguishing these transactions, it will be necessary to penalize
the honest businessman by removing some of the differences simply because
they are effectively undiscoverable. In the same way, it will be necessary
to resort to requirements that will provide only partial solutions, such as
having all equipment leases filed in a centralized office. Apart from its
inefficiency, this kind of response is weak because it reveals a preference for
ignoring the functional differences between transactions instead of giving
legal effect to them. It is thus clear that standards must be developed and used
so that courts may accurately characterize these transactions. It can be
hoped that in deciding future cases under section 1-201(37), the courts will
recognize that they are involved in fact-finding among many varied cases. If
they do recognize this, they will be able to use the tools of section 1-201(37)
without seeking the security of overly broad generalizations which only serve
to cloud the area.
ROBERT J. USKEVICH
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